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Cynthia Willett’s book Interspecies Ethics provides an in-
novative framework from which to explore the possibility of 
a non-anthropocentric cross-species ethic. However, read-
ers should be wary of expecting to find a fully-fledged moral 
system detailing how this would work. Willett’s aim is rather 
to outline the beginnings of biosocial eros ethics – an ethical 
outline that sketches the possibility of a cross-species cosmo-
politan ideal of compassion (agape), derived through acknowl-
edging and emphasizing the existence of spontaneous, play-
ful interaction between social animals. Through entwining 
research from a range of disciplines (Continental philosophy, 
animal behavioral studies, and co-evolutionary theory to name 
but a few), Willett asks: what could a cross-species flourishing 
(eudaimonia) look like? 
Much of Willett’s argument is devoted to finding an egali-
tarian cross-species form of communication without “assum-
ing the presence of human language and conceptual thought or 
even what we modern, adult humans would likely call a self” 
(14).  The purpose of doing so is to show how a cross-species 
form of compassion can emerge without reference to anthropo-
centric forms of communication. Willett’s fullest delineation 
of showcasing a communicative agency that transcends spe-
cies boundaries is the possibility of play and laughter. Vari-
ous case studies are discussed of social carnivores demonstrat-
ing the ability for an egalitarian attitude through suspension 
of predatory-prey relations to engage in play. For instance, 
“wolves may offer a glimpse into a radical origin of ethics as 
they suspend normal social hierarchies and competitive preda-
tory and mating behaviours […] to cultivate friendly bonds in 
joyful play” (62). Through recognizing other social animals at 
play, perhaps humans could find cues that we “have too of-
ten missed – cues that allow us to avoid repeating histories of 
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rogue warfare and rejoin with other species in an unexpected, 
life-affirming solidarity” (48). Willett recognizes that suspen-
sion of predatory-play relationships is not the norm; yet it is 
during this suspension where animals assert their agency of 
compassion through play: “codes of play have built-in rites and 
rules about self-handicapping that do more than ignore social 
hierarchies. These codes protect the vulnerable by enforcing 
the requirement that the powerful set aside their power” (75). 
Willet thus identifies the ethically sublime as manifesting in 
this unexpected “compassion (agape) toward strangers” (142). 
Spontaneous compassion to others, regardless of predatory-
prey relations and species-membership, lays the bedrock for 
ethical biosociality. Willett understands ethical biosociality 
in the following way. The successful flourishing of cross-spe-
cies’ social interaction and co-habitation is to be properly in-
terpreted overtime, regarding whether various “affects” have 
impacted the crystallization or spoilage of a social group over 
several generations. These “affects” are emotional contagions, 
like laughter or play, anger or panic, which spread through a 
community (what Willett calls “biosocial fields”). Laughter, 
for instance, is often contagious, and can reinforce social in-
teraction – one can laugh merely by hearing another laugh, 
a phenomenon found in species other than humans. Our “at-
tunement” (emotional awareness) to these affects are therefore 
not constrained by species boundaries, and gives access to a 
cross-species form of ethicality that desires to maintain and 
reinforce peaceful co-habitation (115). An unethical biosocial-
ity tears the social fabric of cross-species’ interaction. Willett’s 
oft-given example of this is a group of adolescent elephants in 
Uganda, who devastate local villages due to a rupture in the 
social dynamic of their group after poachers killed their elders 
(4).
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The proper ontology for Willett’s biosocial ethic thus tran-
scends focus on moral behaviour of individuals. Instead, we 
ought to interpret our functioning “like nodes in multispe-
cies networks and selves-in-multispecies-communities” (66). 
Willett imagines this ontology through an extension of Karen 
Barad’s philosophical anthropology: to interpret creatures like 
the physical characteristics of light, as both particles and waves. 
While we can perceive ourselves as individual “particles” with 
a recognizable boundary, our interactions and interconnections 
with others create “waves” of affect that spread throughout a 
biosocial field.
These explorations into the relationship between affect at-
tunement and biosocial fields lead Willett to derive a four-
layered non-anthropocentric ethic. The first three layers are 
horizontal, indicating egalitarian interconnections across spe-
cies. The first layer is subjective sociality, which emphasizes 
how ethicality can take shape without need for a “subject” in 
the usual, anthropocentric “self-awareness” sense of the term. 
Instead, the “self” can be understood as one’s own communi-
cation to others (even as basic as an infant crying for help), as 
well as one’s own response to this communication (ultimately, 
a form of call-and-response). The second layer is affect attun-
ement – the phenomenon that allows for social cooperation to 
be sustained through laughter, play, and so on. The third layer 
is the need for biosocial fields to fulfill belonging and a sense 
of home to reinforce social community. The fourth and final 
layer of Willett’s biosocial ethic is a vertical continuum of the 
ethically sublime; at the very bottom lies disgust, while the top 
represents a state where species perform rare moments of com-
passion. Movements up this vertical continuum might be seen 
through the case of Kuni the bonobo trying to free a trapped 
bird – in essence, helping a stranger (128).
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Despite Willett’s ethical model, there remains a surprising 
lack of justification found in this biosocial ethic – especially de-
termining which activities associated at the top of the vertical 
fourth layer ought to be considered ethically sublime. It is not 
enough for Willett to assume performing acts of compassion 
generally is morally valuable; many biosocial fields might find 
one apparent act of compassion from another species disgust-
ing. (Willett writes that the sexual politics of bonobos could 
not work as a transspecies flourishing (102), for example.) The 
danger here is that our intuitive agreement with Willett on the 
moral worthiness of compassion to strangers (regardless of 
species-membership) and disgust at the idea of generalizing the 
sexual politics of bonobos could inadvertently reinforce an an-
thropomorphic morality that Willett endeavours to move away 
from. It is the case that these intuitions still need to be norma-
tively justified from a cross-species perspective. 
Despite this problem, Interspecies remains a fascinating text 
that advances imagination for how a truly non-anthropocentric 
cross-species ethic could manifest.
